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Revelation and Suppression of Private
Information in Settlement-Bargaining
Models
Andrew F. Daughetyt & Jennifer F. Reinganumtt
INTRODUCTION
What do settlement-bargaining models tell us about revela-
tion or suppression of private information about parties' valua-
tions? The law-and-economics literature uses concepts from in-
formation economics, and tools from game theory, to
characterize economic aspects of settlement bargaining.' In this
Article we examine which parties (both those directly interested
and those more distantly interested) become informed about
bargainers' private valuations, recognizing that the rules of civil
procedure in legal proceedings sometimes provide for different
degrees of secrecy and purposeful information suppression.
Revelation or suppression of information about private val-
uations is not relevant in a vacuum, so we will refer to a variety
of "audiences" whose presence or absence can matter. For exam-
ple, in a simple suit involving a defendant facing a plaintiff, the
litigants are part of what we will refer to as "immediate parties,"
as are the litigants' lawyers, any litigation funders (that is, third
parties making loans either to the plaintiff or to one of the law
firms), expert witnesses, and the court to which the litigants
would proceed for trial in the absence of a settlement agreement.
At a greater distance would be "related parties," including
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potential litigants. These potential litigants may be either cur-
rently aware of a case-such as a potential plaintiff who might
sue the same defendant, but has not yet done so-or currently
unaware that they should contemplate bringing suit, but who
might become aware due to information from the original case.
Of course, associated attorneys for these potential litigants are
also related parties. We will reserve the category "distant par-
ties" to refer to agents in possible future suits (litigants, attor-
neys, funders, judges, etc.) who learn from the outcomes of pre-
vious cases and use this information to form beliefs about the
likelihood of various litigation outcomes so as to inform their ac-
tions in future cases not directly related to the instant case. Also
in the set of distant parties are neutral observers, such as aca-
demics, legislators, and journalists (among others) whose prima-
ry interest is the functioning of the legal system.
In what follows we discuss several models of settlement
bargaining, focusing on those models that have distinct implica-
tions about what information is revealed or suppressed, and
with respect to which audiences. In Part I we provide a brief
overview of the two primary models that are employed (in one
form or another) in all the analyses to follow, and we also pro-
vide a brief review of the relevant information-economics con-
cepts. Part II considers models that emphasize immediate par-
ties, while Part III expands attention to related parties. In both
Parts II and III we also discuss what information can be ob-
served by distant parties and the effects those observations
might have on yet other suits. In Part IV we discuss yet further
considerations with respect to distant parties. Lastly we provide
conclusions.
I. STANDARD MODELS FOR SETTLEMENT BARGAINING
EMPLOYING INFORMATION ECONOMICS
In this Part we discuss the two workhorses of settlement-
bargaining analyses (these are the core models that are extend-
ed in various ways in the other Parts of the Article), with atten-
tion paid to the robustness of these primary models. The basic
analysis of settlement bargaining, from an information-
economics perspective, employs an ultimatum game wherein one
party makes an offer and the other party chooses either to
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accept the offer or to reject it (and, since we are usually model-
ing pretrial bargaining, rejection will lead to trial).2
This is a highly stylized story; for instance, it seems to not
allow for counteroffers or revisions of offers. The vast majority of
the papers in the settlement literature have employed this ca-
nonical form of modeling3 One motivation for this form is that
the parties' time preferences are not aligned in favor of early
settlement. To see this, notice that if pretrial interest does not
accumulate on the trial award, then the plaintiff will prefer ear-
lier settlement but the defendant will prefer delay. If pretrial in-
terest does accumulate (at an appropriate rate), then both par-
ties are indifferent about when settlement occurs. The upshot of
these observations is that one cannot rely on both parties being
eager to settle, and so it is plausible for the court to impose a
deadline by scheduling a trial date. While the trial date is not
immutable, neither is it perfectly flexible, so, taking it as a hard
deadline, one can imagine a last period before the trial date that
is of the canonical form. Before this last period, there may have
been offers and counteroffers, but, in the last period, one party
makes the last offer.
Under this model, the literature generally considers one
party to have better information than the other4 and this fact to
be known by both parties. This leads to a modeling simplifica-
tion wherein one party knows precisely a relevant piece of in-
formation (for example, the damages suffered by the plaintiff or
the culpability of the defendant), but the other party knows only
the probability with which the piece of information takes on dif-
ferent possible values (that is, the uninformed party employs a
distribution function-known by both parties-for the possible
values of the piece of relevant information).5 Such models are
2 Later in this Part we consider the robustness of using this canonical two-period
form by considering an explicitly dynamic model, with multiple periods of offers, wherein
settlement may occur at essentially any point in a (possibly long) time horizon, as well as
a paper with endogenously determined choices of whether to move simultaneously or in
sequence. See Part I.C.
3 See Daughety and Reinganum, Settlement at 414 (cited in note 1).
4 See, for example, id at 423-32.
5 As will be discussed below, the possible values of the informed litigant's infor-
mation are called the informed litigant's "types," while the probability distribution is
called the uninformed litigant's "prior beliefs." See Part II.B. Furthermore, in most of
these analyses, disclosure of the information by the informed party is not possible (that
is, not credible), and disclosure or discovery, when incorporated, is usually taken to be
costly.
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known as one-sided asymmetric-information models.6 In these
basic models (and in many more elaborate ones), it is assumed
that any private information is learned through the costly trial
process. 7
Thus, there are two possible ultimatum games of interest.
One version involves the uninformed party making a settlement
offer to the informed party; such analyses are said to employ a
"screening" or "sorting" model.8 The other possibility involves
the informed party making a settlement offer to the uninformed
party; this is called a "signaling" model.9 One form or the other
may fit different specific institutional settings. For example, in a
products-liability suit brought by a consumer against a manu-
facturer, a demand for damages in the plaintiffs complaint
might be thought of as the first move. One might then think
about the model as a signaling game if the plaintiff is likely to
know more about the true harm she suffered, or a screening
game if the defendant is more likely to be the better-informed
party.
Before delving into these two bargaining models, a little no-
tation and a further bit of terminology are needed. Let us say
that the plaintiff, P, has suffered a harm, d, and knows the pre-
cise level of the harm, while the defendant, D, knows only that d
follows a distribution between a low value, denoted as dL, and a
6 Two-sided asymmetric-information models of settlement bargaining, wherein
there are two relevant issues (perhaps both damages and culpability) and each party has
private information about only one of the two pieces, have been considered (via an ulti-
matum game) by Professor Urs Schweizer, Professors Andrew Daughety and Jennifer
Reinganum, and (in a simultaneous-offer game) Professors Daniel Friedman and Donald
Wittman. See Urs Schweizer, Litigation and Settlement under Two-Sided Incomplete In-
formation, 56 Rev Econ Stud 163, 165-67 (1989); Andrew F. Daughety and Jennifer F.
Reinganum, Settlement Negotiations with Two-Sided Asymmetric Information: Model
Duality, Information Distribution, and Efficiency, 14 Intl Rev L & Econ 283, 287-88
(1994); Daniel Friedman and Donald Wittman, Litigation with Symmetric Bargaining
and Two-Sided Incomplete Information, 23 J L, Econ & Org 98, 102-04 (2006). Interest-
ingly, the sequential versions lead to a composition of the signaling and screening games
we consider in this Section. Professor Joel Sobel also allows for a two-sided analysis and
considers disclosure and discovery within the bargaining process. See Joel Sobel, An
Analysis of Discovery Rules, 52 L & Contemp Probs 133, 137-38, 149-53 (Winter 1989).
The one-stage version of his analysis yields an equilibrium like that found by Professors
Reinganum and Louis Wilde, which is discussed in Part I.B; the two-stage version is sim-
ilar to the papers earlier in this footnote (albeit, they do not allow disclosure). Compare
Sobel, 52 L & Contemp Probs at 147 (cited in note 6), with Jennifer F. Reinganum and
Louis L. Wilde, Settlement, Litigation, and the Allocation of Litigation Costs, 17 RAND J
Econ 557, 561-63 (1986).
7 See Daughety and Reinganum, Settlement at 396 (cited in note 1).
8 Id at 420.
9 Id.
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high value, denoted as dH.10 P, however, knows the true value of
d. P knows that D does not know P's actual harm suffered, so P
can accurately evaluate D's perspective when she is trying to
think about how D will react to any settlement demand she
might make. From D's perspective, P could be any type between
(and including) the endpoints of the distribution; that is, P's type
space is all the numbers from dL through dH, even though only
one of these will actually be the realized type.
A. Informational Implications of the Basic Screening Model of
Settlement Bargaining
Continuing with the above example, P is the informed party
and knows her type, while D is the uninformed party and has
beliefs about what P's type is (a probability distribution over the
possible types of P). In a screening model of settlement bargain-
ing, the uninformed party moves first, so that D makes an offer
of settlement to p.11 In the second stage, P either accepts or re-
jects this offer, resulting in either a transfer of money from D to
P (if the offer is accepted) or a trial wherein, if D loses, he must
pay an award to P and (no matter the outcome) both will pay
their court costs. 12 Notice that the types (levels of damages) of P
are ordered from the smallest to the largest, so that any given
offer by D will create two sets of types, with one set (those with
lower damages) accepting the offer and the other set (those with
higher damages) rejecting it.
Using this ordering of P's types, D chooses an offer so as to
minimize his expected cost. Under some reasonable technical
conditions on the model, there is an offer D could make to a
"marginal type" of P, denoted as dM, that would just balance the
10 It is straightforward to reformulate these models to use culpability or expected
damages (the composition of both parameters). Also, in what follows, we associate "she"
with P and "he" with D.
11 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Litigation and Settlement under Imperfect Infor-
mation, 15 RAND J Econ 404, 406 (1984). For mathematical details, see our Article's
Online Technical Appendix *1, online at http://www.vanderbilt.edu/econ/faculty
/Daughety/TechAppforRevelationandSuppression.pdf (visited Mar 2, 2014).
12 These costs are the sum of all expenditures incurred by going to trial, including
court-assessed fees as well as payments to lawyers and experts. These costs can be sig-
nificant in magnitude and reflect the specific scheme used to compensate the lawyer.
This means that the plaintiffs threat to go to trial might not be credible. Most models
assume that the size of the smallest damages award is sufficient to make the threat
credible. See, for example, Bebchuk, 15 RAND J Econ at 406 (cited in note 11). Professor
Barry Nalebuff considers a screening model wherein this assumption is relaxed. See
Barry Nalebuff, Credible Pretrial Negotiation, 18 RAND J Econ 198, 199 (1987).
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marginal expected cost of settling with all types below dM with
the marginal expected cost of going to trial against all types
above dM. Therefore, if P's actual type is below dM, D does not
learn P's actual type (P just accepts the offer and thereby termi-
nates the discussion), while if P's actual type is above dM, she
would go to trial and her actual level of damages would become
part of the public record (revealed). The set of types who would
accept the offer are said to "pool" in that all the types of P with d
at or below dM take the same action (they all accept the offer).
Thus, settlement in a screening model means that private valu-
ations are revealed to immediate parties only if bargaining fails.
B. Informational Implications of the Basic Signaling Model of
Settlement Bargaining
We continue with the same setup as before with one differ-
ence: the informed P makes a settlement demand of the unin-
formed D, so this is a signaling model.13 The defendant, being ra-
tional, uses the demand the informed P makes to infer the true
level of damages he faces (that is, to infer P's type), if at all pos-
sible. A more precise statement is that since D observes P's de-
mand, he can update his beliefs (that is, draw an inference)
about what type (or types) of P would make such a demand if P
anticipates that D will engage in such (Bayesian) updating be-
havior.
Notice that if D were to always accept P's demand, then he
would be likely to overpay via settlement, since lower types of P
would mimic higher types by making demands consistent with
being a higher type. In particular, were D to commit to always
accepting P's demand, then all types would demand as if they
were the highest type, dH. To eliminate the incentive for this
sort of mimicry, in a signaling model D employs a strategy that
rejects P's demands with positive probability (unless, of course,
the demand would be consistent with the lowest type, as D can
do no better at trial). Moreover, higher demands are rejected
with higher probability, so that D imposes a cost on P of inflat-
ing her true level of damages. While the signaling model is tech-
nically more complicated than the screening model, the bottom
13 See Reinganum and Wilde, 17 RAND J Econ at 559 & n 2 (cited in note 6). For
mathematical details, see our Article's Online Technical Appendix at *1-3 (cited in note
11). We adhere to the standard terminology that plaintiffs make demands and defend-
ants make offers.
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line is that D's rejection strategy14 increases sufficiently rapidly
in response to P's demands, eliminating the incentive for differ-
ent types of Ps to mimic types with higher damages; that is, in
equilibrium every type of P ends up making a settlement de-
mand that reflects her actual type. Therefore, the immediate
parties learn P's private valuation; this property is called "full
revelation" (or "full separation"), though as we shall see below,
this revelation need not extend to related or distant parties if
the settlement agreement includes confidentiality as to the
amount. 5
C. Timing and Robustness of the Ultimatum Analyses
Some work has been done to examine the generality of the
timing assumptions. Professor Kathryn Spier has considered a
multiperiod repetition of a screening model (so there are repeat-
ed demands by the uninformed litigant, and repeated decisions
to accept or reject by the informed litigant, but no counteroffers),
in this case an uninformed P versus a D who is informed about
the damages that would have to be paid if the case were to go to
trial.16 In this analysis, P incurs the positive cost of making a
demand in each period. Since money obtained in the future is
worth less to each party than the same amount transferred now
(that is, future transfers to P are discounted),17 the "pie," from
P's perspective, is shrinking. P trades off the cost of negotiation
with the cost of going to trial, recognizing that repeated de-
mands may iteratively reduce uncertainty about D's type and
thereby cause D to accept before the end of the horizon.18 Spier's
prediction is consistent with the observed U-shaped pattern for
settlement (some cases settle quickly, others "on the courthouse
steps").19 While repeated demands in a screening model subdivide
14 This strategy is a function of P's settlement demand, the size of the court costs
each litigant faces, the likelihood that P will win, and both dL and dH, but is independent
of the distribution function (D's prior beliefs) that was so central to the screening model.
15 Andrew F. Daughety and Jennifer F. Reinganum, Informational Externalities in
Settlement Bargaining: Confidentiality and Correlated Culpability, 33 RAND J Econ
587, 590-91 (2002).
16 See Kathryn E. Spier, The Dynamics of Pretrial Negotiation, 59 Rev Econ Stud
93, 95 (1992).
17 See id at 96.
18 See id at 98-100.
19 Professors Paul Fenn and Neil Rickman extend Spier's analysis to reflect the
English cost-allocation (loser-pays) system and obtain similar results. See Paul Fenn and
Neil Rickman, Delay and Settlement in Litigation, 109 Econ J 476, 487 (1999). The U-
shaped prediction has been tested empirically by Professors Gary Fournier and Thomas
The University of Chicago Law Review
the set of settling D types into subsets (each round generates a
new set of types who accept at that point), the true level of D's
private information is, again, revealed only by bargaining fail-
ure.
In a previous article, we considered a (two-period) model
that allows for simultaneous offers or for endogenously deter-
mined sequencing of offers (that is, as represented in one of the
foregoing ultimatum-game models).20 The model starts with one
informed litigant and one uninformed litigant, in which the un-
informed litigant can obtain information at a cost. 21 We show
that while both parties choose to make proposals in the first pe-
riod (that is, they do not wait), the outcome is the same as if one
of the ultimatum-game models had been used.22 Thus, endoge-
nously chosen timing still yields the same results (with respect
to the revelation of private information) as the fixed-timing pat-
terns considered earlier.
II. INFLUENCES FROM IMMEDIATE PARTIES ON SETTLEMENT AND
ON REVELATION
A. Actions Taken by Litigants to Influence Settlement
Bargaining
Professors Thomas Jeitschko and Byung-Cheol Kim illus-
trate the use of actions taken before settlement bargaining so as
to affect the outcome of the bargain.23 In their paper, P may pur-
sue a preliminary injunction (PI) against D (say, in a copyright-
infringement case).24 The standard argument for seeking a PI is
that it is defensive: if D's continuing action creates an irrepara-
ble harm and it is likely that P would win an infringement case
at trial, then a court can grant an injunction restraining D
before the trial concludes (and, more interestingly, before it
Zuehlke and found consistent with data from a survey of civil lawsuits. See Gary M.
Fournier and Thomas W. Zuehlke, The Timing of Out-of-Court Settlements, 27 RAND J
Econ 310, 312 (1996).
20 Andrew F. Daughety and Jennifer F. Reinganum, Endogenous Sequencing in
Models of Settlement and Litigation, 9 J L, Econ & Org 314, 319-22 (1993).
21 Seeid at 319.
22 See id at 336.
23 Thomas D. Jeitschko and Byung-Cheol Kim, Signaling, Learning, and Screening
prior to Trial: Informational Implications of Preliminary Injunctions, 29 J L, Econ & Org
1085, 1090-92 (2013).
24 See id at 1090-91.
[81:83
2014] Revelation and Suppression of Private Information 91
begins).25 Jeitschko and Kim consider a further reason for seek-
ing a PI: it may be strategically beneficial for P, as simply filing
for a PI (a costly action) can credibly signal to D that P's damag-
es exceed a threshold value, and thereby enhance the likelihood
of settlement.26 The analysis employs a screening model of set-
tlement, but allows for the decision by P to pursue a PI before
settlement so as to induce D to update his beliefs about the
magnitude of P's damages.27
Further, the authors assume that filing for a PI leads to a
hearing, whose outcome (a PI is granted or denied) is correlated
with the likely outcome of the trial to which settlement failure
could lead; that is, there can be learning by both parties about
the strength of the case and the likely outcome of the infringe-
ment proceeding itself.28 They show that being denied a PI may
increase the likelihood of settlement, as P is now less optimistic
about winning at trial, while the granting of a PI makes P more
optimistic about eventually winning and can reduce the frequen-
cy of settlement.29
Two papers have reconsidered the screening model and al-
lowed for investment in case strength, which affects settlement
bargaining (and the likelihood of bargaining failure) and thereby
the release of private information. 3° Professors Philippe Chon6
and Laurent Linnemer allow the informed P to make a costly
investment in case preparation that raises the overall net payoff
she obtains from the trial (if trial occurs). The investment deci-
sion by P is observed by D before he makes an offer (that is, the
investment can act as a signal to D, and D's offer is then part of
a screening analysis). 31 The information is of use to D because, in
25 See id at 1088-91.
26 See id at 1099.
27 See Jeitschko and Kim, 29 J L, Econ & Org at 1095-96 (cited in note 23).
28 See id at 1101-02.
29 See id at 1103. Here the result may depend strongly upon the use of the screen-
ing model of settlement bargaining, as D underadjusts the offer made to settle due to the
fact that not only does the marginal type adjust up, but also the set of inframarginal
types (those with damages less than the marginal type) expands and all these types can
free ride on any increase in the offer by D.
30 Philippe Chon6 and Laurent Linnemer, Optimal Litigation Strategies with Ob-
servable Case Preparation, 70 Games & Econ Behav 271, 272 (2010); Amy Farmer and
Paul Pecorino, Discovery and Disclosure with Asymmetric Information and Endogenous
Expenditure at Trial, 42 J Legal Stud 223, 224-25 (2013).
31 See Chon6 and Linnemer, 70 Games & Econ Behav at 274 (cited in note 30). Sim-
ilar to the analysis in Part L.A of the screening model, an offer made will make some type
of P indifferent between going to trial and settling; this preference is now influenced by
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equilibrium, it is the higher-damaged types (who would need a
higher offer in order to settle) who generally invest in case prep-
aration as long as trial costs are not too great. However, this en-
courages some types with lower damages to invest, so as to try
to suggest they have high damages; this bluffing persists in
equilibrium and varies with the model's parameters. 32 While
quantitative differences in the set of types that settle occur, pri-
vate information is fully revealed only if there is bargaining
failure and the case goes to trial.
While Chon6 and Linnemer consider investments before
bargaining, Professors Amy Farmer and Paul Pecorino consider
investments in improving their cases after bargaining fails.a3 In
this case the investments in case strength cannot signal infor-
mation, but the presence of the option later in the sequence of
activities can affect settlement (which is modeled using a screen-
ing game).34 Moreover, if bargaining fails, then the type of P is
revealed (as before). Thus, the ability to invest in the quality of
the case at trial can feed back into the bargaining phase, caus-
ing more settlement and sometimes more revelation of private
information (for example, if P chooses disclosure).35
B. An Imperfectly Informed Trial Court Judge
In all of the foregoing analyses, courts (embodied as a single
decision-making judge) are always assumed to learn the true
value of the relevant information at trial.36 Under this assump-
tion the judge's decision cannot be influenced by the settlement-
bargaining process; it is simply the outside option should bar-
gaining fail. However, if the judge is modeled as receiving an
imperfectly informative observation of P's true harm-
specifically, he receives a perfectly informative observation with
some probability and with the complementary probability he
the possible trial costs P may face, the cost of the investment in case preparation, and
the size of the gain in net value of the case due to the investment.
32 See Chon6 and Linnemer, 70 Games & Econ Behav at 280 (cited in note 30).
33 See Farmer and Pecorino, 42 J Legal Stud at 223-24 (cited in note 30).
34 See id at 224-25.
35 Space limitations unfortunately preclude a discussion of discovery or disclosure,
as the general literature in this area is quite extensive. For early analyses of disclosure
and discovery within the settlement-bargaining game, see Sobel, 52 L & Contemp Probs
at 150-55 (cited in note 6); Steven Shavell, Sharing of Information prior to Settlement or
Litigation, 20 RAND J Econ 183, 189 (1989). See also Farmer and Pecorino, 42 J Legal
Stud at 234-38 (cited in note 30).
36 See Daughety and Reinganum, Settlement at 338 (cited in note 1).
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receives a completely uninformative observation-then the
judge's subsequent reliance on information from the settlement
stage will affect the plaintiffs and defendant's bargaining be-
havior. In a previous article, we provided such a model in a sig-
naling framework; we considered two different evidentiary rules
about how a judge can subsequently rely on the outcome of set-
tlement negotiations. 37
First, and consistent with prevailing evidentiary rules,38 the
judge cannot observe the settlement demand that was made, he
can observe only that settlement negotiations failed, and he (in-
evitably) uses this observation to revise his prior distribution
about P's likely level of damages (in the event that he does not
receive a perfectly informative observation at trial); this game is
similar to that considered in Part I.B. Because cases with lower
damages are more likely to settle than cases with higher dam-
ages, if the judge observes that a case has come to trial (and he
does not observe the true damages at trial), then the expected
damages he awards conditional on settlement having failed are
higher than P's ex ante expected damages (based on the prior
distribution of damages). Second, the model is modified to allow
the judge to observe the plaintiffs settlement demand (that is,
this demand is introduced as evidence at trial) and to use this
observation to revise his prior distribution about P's likely level
of damages (in the event that he does not receive a perfectly in-
formative observation at trial).39 Notice that now there are two
uninformed parties that are making inferences about P's true
damages from her settlement demand. P wants to persuade both
D and the judge (in the event that the judge does not observe her
true damages perfectly at trial) that her damages are high, so
her temptation to inflate her demand is greater when her de-
mand is observable to the judge as well as D. We find that when
the judge is sufficiently likely to observe P's true damages at tri-
al, then there will still be an equilibrium wherein P's demand
reveals her damages.40 However, in order to induce revelation, D
must reject P's demands with a higher probability in order to
counteract her higher temptation to inflate her demand. Since
37 See Andrew F. Daughety and Jennifer F. Reinganum, Keeping Society in the
Dark: On the Admissibility of Pretrial Negotiations as Evidence in Court, 26 RAND J
Econ 203, 205-06 (1995).
38 See FRE 408.
39 See Daughety and Reinganum, 26 RAND J Econ at 204 (cited in note 37).
40 Seeid at 213.
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P's demand is revealing, the judge always learns her damages
perfectly at trial, either through direct observation or through
her revealing settlement demand. Thus, in this parameter con-
figuration, the judge learns more information and makes more
accurate awards (than if P's demand were not observable), but
this comes at a higher cost as more cases go to trial.
As the judge's observation at trial becomes increasingly im-
perfect (and therefore he must increasingly rely on the inference
he makes from P's settlement demand), the nature of the bar-
gaining-equilibrium outcome changes. In particular, there is a
set of higher-damaged plaintiffs who cannot be deterred from
pooling at a very high demand that provokes rejection by the de-
fendant. Essentially, these plaintiff types give up on trying to
settle with D (who therefore does not learn P's true damages
during settlement negotiations) and focus on persuading the
judge that their damages are high. If the judge's observation at
trial is sufficiently imperfect (and therefore he must rely heavily
on the inference he makes from P's settlement demand), then all
plaintiff types pool at a high demand, so that D does not learn
P's true damages during settlement negotiations. Moreover, all
cases go to trial so that not only does the judge learn nothing
from P's observed (but uninformative) settlement demand, he
cannot even draw a meaningful inference from the fact that the
case failed to settle; his posterior beliefs are his prior beliefs.
As long as the judge observes P's harm imperfectly at trial
(and therefore would rely, at least to some extent, on infor-
mation contained in the settlement demand), it turns out that
keeping settlement demands inadmissible as evidence at trial
reduces the ex ante expected number of trials, although the par-
ties do not agree on which policy is best: on an ex ante basis, D
prefers that P's demand be admissible, while P prefers that it
remain inadmissible. The reduction in the ex ante expected
number of trials suggests that this is a situation in which infor-
mation suppression may actually be beneficial: information sup-
pression via one channel (the evidentiary rule) reduces expected
litigation costs and may improve information revelation via an-
other channel (the settlement process).
A distant party can infer P's true damages from any publicly
available details of a successful settlement demand. 41 If the case
41 If the settlement amount is confidential, then a distant party (who can, presum-
ably, also calculate the equilibrium strategies for P and D) will update his or her beliefs
to reflect the information contained in the fact that the case settled. Basically, since a P
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goes to trial instead, he will learn the same amount as the judge,
although this will vary depending on the admissibility of the set-
tlement demand.
C. A Litigation Funder
Now reconsider the base model wherein an informed P
makes a settlement demand of an uninformed D; moreover, as-
sume that the judge learns the true harm perfectly at trial. In
this Section, we discuss the impact of consumer legal funding on
settlement behavior.42 In order to be eligible for consumer legal
funding, P must be represented by an attorney, and this will
very likely mean that the attorney is first in line to receive a
share of the proceeds (via a contingent-fee contract) from either
settlement or trial. Consumer legal funding entails a litigation
funder making a nonrecourse loan to P.43 The nonrecourse as-
pect means that P need only repay the litigation funder out of
her remaining (after paying her attorney) proceeds of either set-
tlement or trial. Thus, this model will involve two other immedi-
ate parties: P's attorney and the litigation funder. However, we
will take the contingent-fee contract as given and focus on the
interaction between the P and the litigation funder in order to
examine how an optimally structured nonrecourse loan affects
the bargaining between P and D.
The basic structure of this model involves P first consulting
with an attorney to verify that she has a valid suit; we take this
consultation to involve verification of the prior distribution of
her damages award should she win her suit at trial. Then P,
now represented by counsel, contracts with a litigation funder;
at this point, all parties on P's side have common knowledge of
the distribution of damages. The contract consists of an up-
front payment from the litigation funder to the plaintiff, and a
with lower damages is more likely to settle, the distant party's posterior distribution of
harm will be downward revised relative to the prior distribution. We discuss confidential
settlement in Part III.
42 See generally Andrew Daughety and Jennifer Reinganum, The Effect of Third-
Party Funding of Plaintiffs on Settlement (forthcoming in Am Econ Rev), online at
http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/VUECONNUECON-14-00002.pdf (visited Mar 2, 2014).
For a description of consumer legal funding, see Steven Garber, Alternative Litigation
Financing in the United States: Issues, Knowns, and Unknowns *9-12 (RAND Law, Fi-
nance, and Capital Markets Program Occasional Paper Series, 2010), online at
http://www.rand.org/contentdam/randpubs/occasional-papers/2OlORAND- P306.pdf
(visited Mar 2, 2014).
43 See Garber, Alternative Litigation Financing at *9-10 (cited in note 42).
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specification of what P owes the litigation funder (the repayment
amount) should there be any proceeds from the suit (via either
settlement or trial). The nonrecourse aspect implies that P will
never repay more than she receives. 44 Then P returns to her at-
torney and they prepare the complaint; during this time period
P and her attorney inevitably learn more about her true damag-
es (assume, for simplicity, that they learn this perfectly). Final-
ly, the complaint is filed and it contains P's settlement demand,
to which D responds.
In the basic signaling model of settlement negotiations dis-
cussed in Part I.B, a revealing equilibrium can exist because the
payoff from P's outside option of going to trial is increasing in
the amount of her damages (which is her private information).
In a previous article, we considered the full range of repayment
amounts, in which a repayment amount of zero results in the
basic revealing equilibrium. 45 As the repayment amount is
raised, at first the equilibrium remains a revealing one, but trial
occurs more often.
As the repayment amount rises yet further, eventually P's
net payoff at trial (that is, her payoff after repaying the litiga-
tion funder to the greatest extent possible) becomes zero for a
set of (lower-damaged) types; indeed, for every repayment
amount there is a unique marginal type whose net payoff at trial
is just zero. Since P's payoff from the outside option of going to
trial no longer increases with her type for those types that net
zero at trial, these types cannot use the settlement demand to
signal or reveal their types. Rather, they must make the same
pooling settlement demand. The remaining (higher-damaged)
plaintiff types' payoffs from the outside option of going to trial
still continue to increase with type, and thus this higher set of
types can use the settlement demand to signal their types. This
results in a partial-pooling equilibrium wherein types in the
lower-damaged set make a common demand and D accepts it,
whereas types in the higher-damaged set make revealing de-
mands that D rejects with a positive probability that increases
44 While there are many possible reasons why such a contract can benefit P and the
litigation funder (for example, P may have worse access to credit markets and may
therefore discount her future income more heavily than does the litigation funder, or the
plaintiff may be more risk averse than the litigation funder), we abstract from these and
focus only on the effect of such a loan contract on the subsequent settlement bargaining
between P and D.
45 See Daughety and Reinganum, The Effect of Third-Party Funding of Plaintiffs on
Settlement at *6 & n 7 (cited in note 42).
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with the demand. As the repayment amount rises yet further,
the set of pooling types increases, and the remaining higher-
damaged plaintiff types' demands are rejected for sure, as any
positive probability of acceptance would tempt the pooling types
to mimic a higher-damaged type. Finally, as the repayment
amount continues to rise, all types anticipate a net payoff of zero
from trial and hence all types make a common pooling demand
(equal to the average expected damages plus D's trial costs),
which D accepts. It is straightforward to show that this com-
plete-pooling outcome maximizes the expected combined payoff
of the plaintiff and the litigation funder, as it fully extracts D
and there are no litigation costs because every suit settles.46
The effect of consumer lending on information transmission
is quite dramatic. Within the plaintiff and defendant bargaining
game, consumer legal funding removes P's incentive to signal
her type and thus no information is transmitted. Moreover, eve-
ry suit settles at the average demand so a distant party learns
nothing from either the settlement amount itself or the trial (as
there are no trials in equilibrium). Although information trans-
mission is suppressed, this is actually a Pareto-superior outcome
(considering only the immediate parties) since all actors on P's
side (P, her attorney, and the litigation funder) are better off
and D is exactly as well off as if there were no litigation funding
(and thus D's incentives to take care are not diluted by the in-
creased amount of settlement). On the other hand, notice that
distant parties learn no more than the average damages for the
case.
III. INFLUENCES FROM RELATED PARTIES ON SETTLEMENT AND
ON REVELATION
In this Part, we consider models involving important inter-
actions between immediate parties and other related parties.
For instance, a P and D who are currently engaged in a lawsuit
may anticipate that there are other potential Ps (or, perhaps,
46 Although P's attorney is not modeled as an active player in this scenario, he is
also quite happy with this litigation-funding contract since he never has to go to trial,
which entails both a cost and a risk of losing the suit. The optimal repayment amount
can be quite substantial, and some have remarked that the imputed interest rate is
enormous, but it is misleading to think in these terms because of the nonrecourse nature
of the loan. See Garber, Alternative Litigation Financing at *10 (cited in note 42). Final-
ly, it is essential that control rights stay with P, as should the litigation funder buy the
case from P, then bargaining will now be as in Part I.B, with a positive likelihood of bar-
gaining failure.
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other potential Ds) that could be brought into the current suit
(for example, via joinder, class action, or joint and several liabil-
ity) or could be involved in a follow-on suit depending on the sta-
tus or outcome of the current suit. The parties to the immediate
suit may modify their behavior in anticipation of what infor-
mation will be transmitted (or suppressed) to these other related
parties (for example, they may use confidential settlement
agreements so as to reduce the likelihood of follow-on suits).
A. Sequentially Related Suits without Confidentiality
In some scenarios, there may be a sequence of plaintiffs su-
ing a common defendant wherein the outcome in the early suit
can influence the filing and conduct of later suits. 47 Professor
Yeon-Koo Che and Jong Goo Yi consider a sequence of plaintiffs
suing the same defendant for damages. 48 Each P has private in-
formation about her own damages and D makes the settlement
offer; thus, the authors employ a sequence of screening models. 49
There is a (commonly known) probability that D will be found li-
able in the early suit; if that suit settles, then the same probabil-
ity applies in the later suit.50 But if that suit goes to court, then
the probability that D will be found liable in the later suit is
higher if the early P wins (in which case D will make a higher
settlement offer in the later suit) and lower if the early P loses
(in which case D will make a lower settlement offer in the later
suit). These probabilities need not be one and zero, respectively,
but the extent of updating is also assumed to be common
knowledge. This updating can be viewed as learning something
from the trial outcome about how the law applies in such cases.
Thus, it can be viewed as a weak version of collateral estoppel or
47 A prominent example is an antitrust suit wherein a government suit may estab-
lish the D's guilt and follow-on civil suits for treble damages need establish only the level
of harm caused by D's anticompetitive behavior. In this context, Professor Hugh Briggs,
Kathleen Huryn, and Professor Mark McBride use a signaling model: D's private infor-
mation concerns his guilt, and here a high offer implies guilt. See Hugh C. Briggs III,
Kathleen D. Huryn, and Mark E. McBride, Treble Damages and the Incentive to Sue and
Settle, 27 RAND J Econ 770, 775 (1996). Innocent Ds never offer to settle with the gov-
ernment; some guilty Ds do offer, knowing that this will trigger (private) follow-on suits
that they will then also settle. Innocent Ds (and guilty Ds who are mimicking the inno-
cent) make no offer and face the possibility of trial, which would reveal their type. Thus,
related parties obtain information both via trial and via settlement.
48 See generally Yeon-Koo Che and Jong Goo Yi, The Role of Precedents in Repeated
Litigation, 9 J L, Econ & Org 399 (1993).
49 Seeid at 402.
50 See id at 404-05.
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as the development of precedents that will apply in predictable
ways to future suits.
The question at issue in this model is whether the existence
of the later case will cause a defendant to seek trial more often
or less often in order to establish or avoid (respectively) a prece-
dential decision.51 Che and Yi find that when the probability
that D will be found liable in the early suit is above a threshold
value, then D will have a greater incentive to avoid trial by mak-
ing a higher settlement offer and settling with more plaintiff
types in the early suit.52 Conversely, when the probability that D
will be found liable in the early suit is below the threshold value,
then D will have a greater incentive to provoke trial by making
a lower settlement offer and settling with fewer plaintiff types in
the early suit. Thus, the potential to learn about how the law
applies to a given issue or to establish a precedent may result in
either more or less trial and hence lead to more or less revela-
tion of information to the related party and to distant parties,
depending on the magnitude of the prior probability of liability.
Professors Xinyu Hua and Kathryn Spier consider a scenar-
io in which a single P faces two Ds in sequence; P's damages are
perfectly correlated in the two suits and both Ds are uninformed
about P's damages, while P's damages are her private infor-
mation.53 Using a screening model wherein the uninformed, ear-
ly D makes a settlement offer to the informed P, they show that
plaintiff types with higher damages have a stronger incentive to
go to trial against the early D (as compared to the situation
wherein there is no later D) because P benefits directly from a
high award at trial in the early case and she also benefits indi-
rectly because a higher award induces the later D to increase his
level of care. 54 Indeed, the first suit may go to trial too often (as
compared to the social optimum) 55 Both the early and the later
D (and any distant parties) learn the true harm if the suit goes
to trial, but in the event the early suit settles, they can update
51 See id at 399-401. Che and Yi consider another version of their model wherein
the defendant's liability in the two suits is uncorrelated but the plaintiffs' damages are
correlated. They assume that both suits are ultimately filed, whereas Yang is concerned
with finding circumstances under which behavior in the early suit can deter the later
suit. Compare id at 414-17, with Bill Z. Yang, Litigation, Experimentation, and Reputa-
tion, 16 Intl Rev L & Econ 491, 496-99 (1996).
52 See Che and Yi, 9 J L, Econ & Org at 406-07 (cited in note 48).
53 Xinyu Hua and Kathryn E. Spier, Information and Externalities in Sequential
Litigation, 161 J Institutional & Theoretical Econ 215, 226-27 (2005).
54 See id at 227.
55 See id at 223-24.
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their beliefs about harm based only on the observation that set-
tlement occurred.
This model has the interesting feature that the allocation of
liability between P and the Ds has an impact on the extent to
which information is revealed (through failed settlement result-
ing in trial) and the extent to which the later D adjusts his level
of care in response. Since this information is productive, the op-
timal design of the liability system accounts for the extent and
value of information revelation by allocating some liability to
each party.
B. Confidential Settlement
A D's behavior is often the alleged cause of harm to multiple
private Ps who bring suit sequentially. Suits may arise in se-
quence because Ps learn about the source of their harm only
from observing prior suits, or their harms can be realized at dif-
ferent times due to latency. In this Section, we first discuss a
model wherein two Ps sue the same D in sequence. The same D
is involved in both suits, so the outcome of the early suit may
reveal relevant information about D's culpability to a later P.
Anticipation of the second suit will influence the outcome of the
first suit, including any possible settlement agreement between
D and the early P. This leads to bargaining over both the set-
tlement amount and over an agreement to maintain confidenti-
ality (in the first suit) regarding the settlement.56
In a previous article, we assumed that the existence of the
later P is common knowledge between the early P and D, but
they also both know that this later P will file suit only if she be-
comes aware of D's involvement in her harm.57 This awareness is
highest following a trial, moderate following an open (with ob-
servable details) settlement, and lowest following a confidential
56 Yang also reports results for a version of his model wherein the amount of the
early settlement is confidential. See Yang, 16 Intl Rev L & Econ at 499-500 (cited in note
51). Since confidentiality affects the willingness of the later P to file suit, it affects D's
strategic use of trial in the early suit.
57 See Daughety and Reinganum, 33 RAND J Econ at 587-88 (cited in note 15). In
a related article, a P bargains with a D who possesses two bits of private information: D
knows his likelihood of being found liable in the instant suit, and he knows whether he
will face a second P later. In that analysis, which involves a sequence of screening mod-
els, the likelihoods that D will be found liable in the two cases are assumed to be inde-
pendent of one another. See Andrew F. Daughety and Jennifer F. Reinganum, Hush
Money, 30 RAND J Econ 661, 667 (1999).
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settlement.8 Moreover, D's culpability (the likelihood that he
will be found liable) in the two suits is assumed to be the same,
although the outcomes of the two suits need not be the same (it
is as if a coin is flipped in each case, but it is the same coin).
Whereas D knows this likelihood, neither P knows it. However,
when D responds to the first P's demand, this response can re-
veal information about his culpability. In particular, it is as-
sumed that this likelihood is revealed by a trial, but only infer-
ences about it can be made from a settlement (as is typical in
screening models), and the inference can be refined based on
whether the settlement is open or confidential. This inference
will govern the settlement demand that the later P will make of
D, so D will take this into consideration in responding to the ear-
ly P's demand (and the early P will take this into consideration
in formulating her demand).
It is shown that, conditional on the status of settlements (ei-
ther open or confidential), equilibrium involves two rounds of
screening. In the early suit, P goes to trial with a D whose like-
lihood of being found liable lies below an equilibrium threshold
level, but otherwise settles. In the later suit (if it is filed) follow-
ing a settlement, the later P goes to trial against those D types
with a relatively low likelihood of being found liable (but not an
absolutely low level, as those D types went to trial in the first
suit), and otherwise settles.
One might think that only the "worst" types would engage
in confidential (as compared to open) settlement, but this is not
the case: an interesting (and a bit counterintuitive) finding is
that the set of D types that settles in equilibrium is larger under
confidential settlement (that is, involves a lower marginal type)
than under open settlement.59 Confidential settlement reduces
the probability of a later suit due to reduced publicity, and thus
any D type is willing to pay more for confidentiality. Therefore,
to induce the same marginal D type to settle, the early P can
demand more under confidential than under open settlement.60
But if P is just indifferent under a regime of open settlement
about inducing a particular (marginal) type to settle, then she
strictly wants to induce this type to settle under a regime of con-
fidential settlement. Thus, the early P settles with more defend-
ant types under confidential than under open settlement. On the
58 See Daughety and Reinganum, 33 RAND J Econ at 588 (cited in note 15).
59 See id at 596.
60 See id.
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other hand, because more defendant types settle in the early
case, it turns out that the later P (should she file suit) goes to
trial with more D types under confidential than under open set-
tlement.61
By observing the sequence of suits, a distant party could
learn D's type in the early suit if the case went to trial; if that
suit settled, the distant party could learn D's type in the later
suit if that suit went to trial; only if D settled in both suits
would a distant party be left with purely an inference (based on
the screening demands) about D's culpability. It turns out that
the set of D types that is revealed by trial via either the first or
the second suit is unaffected by whether settlement is confiden-
tial or open, provided the later suit is filed. But since confiden-
tial settlement in the early suit suppresses some later suits by
reducing publicity, the overall impact of confidentiality is to re-
sult in fewer trials, and thus less information is revealed to dis-
tant parties. 62
C. Joinder and Settlement
In the previous discussions, the roles of early and later Ps
were exogenous, and each suit was pursued separately. In a pre-
vious article, we allowed for permissive joinder of cases, wherein
the number of Ps is random (for simplicity, one or two), and the
timing of their filing of suit is endogenously determined.63 If an
individual is a victim, then she observes this fact (and her dam-
ages) privately. Neither D nor any other potential victim ob-
serves the total number of victims or their damages (which are
independent and identical draws from a commonly known
61 See id.
62 When settlements of product-safety-related lawsuits are confidential (which ap-
pears to be common), firms will choose to provide less safe products. See Andrew F.
Daughety and Jennifer F. Reinganum, Secrecy and Safety, 95 Am Econ Rev 1074, 1083
(2005). Thus, even though confidentiality may more readily induce some settlement (and
clear court dockets), it has a negative effect on product quality.
63 See Andrew F. Daughety and Jennifer F. Reinganum, A Dynamic Model of Law-
suit Joinder and Settlement, 42 RAND J Econ 471, 472 (2011). Class action suits are a
special type of joinder, with their own rules. See FRCP 23. Che considers the formation
of classes and allows for opt-outs. See generally Yeon-Koo Che, Equilibrium Formation
of Class Action Suits, 62 J Pub Econ 339 (1996). There, the damage level (high or low) is
each victim's private information, and the class (if it wins) will receive damages suffi-
cient to provide each member with the average harm. See id at 341, 343. This results in
the class and the opt-outs being a mix of high- and low-type plaintiffs.
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distribution).64 Each potential plaintiff can decide whether and
when to file suit (at a fixed cost), whether to join her suit with
that of another victim who has already filed suit (which lowers
the litigation costs per plaintiff and increases the likelihood that
each P will prevail), and whether to drop a suit that she has
previously filed.
In the benchmark case wherein settlement is not allowed,
we previously found that the equilibrium resembles a "band-
wagon."65 Each victim pursues a strategy that involves the fol-
lowing behavior (think of this occurring over two time periods):
1. If damages are sufficiently high, file suit in period 1.
2. If damages are moderate, wait in period 1 and then file
suit in period 2 only if another victim filed suit in period 1.
3. If damages are sufficiently low, then do not file suit in
either period even if another victim filed suit in period 1.66
The set of victim types that file suit in period 1 involves
some types that will file even if it were known that there were
no other victims, and some (lower-damage) types that will file
suit in period 1 in the hope that there is another victim out
there-who may be waiting in period 1-but who will file in pe-
riod 2 and join the first P. This set of lower-damage plaintiff
types will regret having filed suit if they are not joined by an-
other P (but the filing cost is sunk); indeed, if the trial costs are
sufficiently high, then such a P will drop her suit if she is not
joined by another P. Note further that joinder can induce suits
that would not have been pursued on a stand-alone basis (be-
cause of having an expected value less than zero, due to the cost
of pursuing the litigation) to now be pursued. To the degree that
this results in information about such suits being revealed, dis-
tant parties learn more about the distribution of harm.
In the benchmark model, if a suit is filed and goes to trial,
then D and any distant parties will learn the true damages. If a
suit is filed, but subsequently dropped, then D and any distant
parties will know that the damages lie within a subset of the
original range (high enough to justify filing, but low enough to
justify subsequently dropping, the suit). If only one suit is filed
(or no suits are filed) then D and any distant parties do not
64 P and D are assumed to know the maximum possible number of victims (for ex-
ample, the number of buyers of a product).
65 Daughety and Reinganum, 42 RAND J Econ at 472 (cited in note 63).
66 See id at 477.
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know whether there was only one victim (or no victims, respec-
tively) nor what harm these nonfiling victims might have en-
dured (though Bayesian updating about the number of victims
and their damages is possible).
Next, we allow D to settle strategically (and perhaps confi-
dentially) with a single early filer in order to undermine the fil-
ing of a later suit (by eliminating the possibility of scale econo-
mies with respect to cost or to evidence production).67 D may
have a substantial motivation to settle if it is possible that there
is a second victim but she is unaware that her harm is attribut-
able to D's behavior.68 In this case, a confidential settlement may
preclude the second victim from even learning about the first
victim's suit (and thereby making the connection between her
harm and D's behavior). The ability to undermine the filing of a
later suit makes it optimal for D to settle (and confidentially, if
possible) a single early suit. Furthermore, even though the mod-
el assumes that D makes the settlement offer (and therefore has
all of the bargaining power), he must compensate the early P for
the forgone scale economies she might have enjoyed if a later P
joined her suit (and which she could obtain by going to trial in-
stead of settling).
Anticipating all of this, what is the optimal filing behavior
of a victim who knows D caused her harm? Such a victim knows
that there is now no advantage to waiting until period 2: if there
is another victim and if that victim were to file in period 1, then
D would settle the case and there would be no one to join in pe-
riod 2. Thus, the "bandwagon" turns into a "gold rush" wherein
all suits that will be filed are filed in period 1.69 If all victims are
sufficiently aware of the connection between their harm and D's
behavior, then there are conditions under which D would prefer
that preemptive settlement be prohibited (because the total
number of cases filed is higher in the gold rush equilibrium than
in the bandwagon equilibrium). On the other hand, if all victims
are sufficiently unaware of the connection between their harm
67 See Daughety and Reinganum, 42 RAND J Econ at 480-83 (cited in note 63). If
both victims file in period 1, D will still settle but has no additional incentives to do so
beyond simply saving trial costs in the joint suit.
68 The model assumes that a harmed victim has a base probability of discovering
the link between her harm and D's behavior, but any further improvement in this proba-
bility is suppressed by confidential settlement, whereas an open settlement raises this
probability to one.
69 See Daughety and Reinganum, 42 RAND J Econ at 488 (cited in note 63).
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and D's behavior, then D will prefer a regime of confidential set-
tlement to one of prohibited settlement.
There are two margins of information revelation that are af-
fected by settlement. First, the set of victim types that file suit is
affected; as noted above, this set can be (but need not be) larger
when only open settlement is allowed. Second, if some victims
are unaware that D is responsible for their harm, then confiden-
tial settlement can have a substantial blocking effect on infor-
mation revelation, and an unaware victim may be deterred from
filing, even if she has suffered significant harm. This latter ef-
fect is particularly troublesome for a distant party because there
are now multiple reasons for the observation that no suits were
filed: First, D's behavior may not have caused harm. Second, D's
behavior may have caused harm but at a level insufficient to
warrant a suit. Lastly, D's behavior may have caused substan-
tial harm, but the victims may be unaware of the connection be-
tween their harm and D's behavior and will remain unaware be-
cause information revelation via an early suit was suppressed by
confidential settlement.
IV. FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INFORMATION
AND DISTANT PARTIES
Recall that distant parties include those without a direct in-
terest in the current suit (or in directly related actions) but with
a more generally derived interest, such as drawing conclusions
about the prospects for a suit that they are contemplating.70 The
presence of distant parties reflects the fact that lawsuits that
yield publicly available information provide a public good. This
argument is especially noteworthy for suits that go to trial 71 but,
to a somewhat more limited degree, would also hold for settle-
ments that are publicly available. This latter point reflects the
fact that it is costly to search over all possible settlement agree-
ments (less so for public records from trials, but even this type of
search is costly since many court-sanctioned agreements are
70 See Introduction.
71 For an early argument along this line, discussed from the perspective of justice,
see Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 Yale L J 1073, 1085-87 (1984). Hua and Spier,
discussed earlier in Part III.A, also argue that since trial may involve greater investiga-
tion of the damages than settlement, trial with an early defendant creates a positive ex-
ternality if the later defendant uses the information released via the first D's trial to ad-
just his choice of precautionary investment. See Hua and Spier, 161 J Institutional &
Theoretical Econ at 230 (cited in note 53).
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documented only at the county level), so the mere existence of an
open settlement agreement does not imply the diffusion of in-
formation to all potentially interested, but distant, parties. Even
the advent of online sources of information has not made the dif-
fusion of such information automatic or universal. For example,
Professors Eric Helland and Gia Lee discuss the recent devel-
opment of state-operated medical-malpractice websites with in-
formation about doctors and osteopaths, but: (1) only seventeen
states currently operate such web sites, (2) data on the web sites
may be (purposely) only in aggregate or censored form, and (3)
types of data disclosed differ from state to state.7 2
One might wonder whether potential litigants (or their law-
yers) are actually influenced by the presence of information
about the outcomes of previous trials for similar cases. In par-
ticular, are distant parties influenced by such aggregate infor-
mation? Recently, Professor Seth Seabury has examined a ver-
sion of this question by regressing damage awards in individual
cases against the average award in similar cases (in the same
jurisdiction) for a previous year, finding a negative relationship
between past and present outcomes.7 3 Allowing for the possibil-
ity that this effect reflects an increase in the deterrence effect of
liability or that large past awards bias juries or judges, Seabury
finds stronger support for a "settlement effect": larger previous
awards induce more current Ps to pursue less valuable cases to
trial rather than settling. 74
There is, potentially, a second source of influence on the pri-
or assessments that distant parties make and on their behavior
in settlement negotiations. Normally, when we think about cau-
sation in a lawsuit, we have in mind a definable sequence of ac-
tions that leads from the tortfeasor to the victim. However, the
sources of many modern harms are harder to pinpoint. Particu-
larly in the case of torts arising in certain mass-marketed prod-
ucts (for example, pharmaceuticals, tobacco, and vaccines) or
from mass-exposure incidents (for example, exposure of ground
troops to dioxin or exposure of workers to hazardous chemicals,
72 See Eric Helland and Gia Lee, Secrecy, Settlements, and Medical Malpractice Lit-
igation, in Joseph W. Doherty, Robert T. Reville, and Laura Zakaras, eds, Confidentiali-
ty, Transparency, and the U.S. Civil Justice System 3, 6-7 (Oxford 2012).
73 Seth A. Seabury, Jury Verdicts, Settlement Behavior, and Expected Trial Out-
comes, 33 Intl Rev L & Econ 15, 20 (2013).
74 See id at 21-22.
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such as nickel-cadmium fumes in the making of batteries75), the
inability of science to provide a precise description of the mecha-
nism of causation has encouraged courts to rely on the testimony
of experts who employ aggregate data and epidemiological
analyses to assess the issue of general (in contrast with specific)
causation via the assessment of the relative risk of a product
causing a particular harm.76 This reliance by courts on the use of
summary statistics can, in turn, influence distant parties in
their assessments as to whether to bring suit, the settlement
demand to make, and the likelihood of settlement 77 In this con-
text, we use a screening model wherein D knows his true liabil-
ity for a harm and P makes a settlement demand of D, but D
cannot credibly prove his known level of liability in court.78 We
show that anticipation that courts will use the prevalence of
harm in a population to draw an inference of causation can lead
to a "rational optimism effect" that creates increased incentives
for higher settlement demands7 9
Thus, there is a twofold effect of information revelation on
distant parties. First, revelation via either trial or publicly
available records affects the formation of prior assessments by
distant litigants involved in their own suits. Second, adoption by
courts of procedures that depend upon aggregate summary sta-
tistics derived from available databases for the adjudication pro-
cess may influence how distant parties approach the bargaining
problem.
75 See, for example, In re 'Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 597 F Supp
740, 780-90 (EDNY 1984); Christophersen v Allied-Signal Corp, 939 F2d 1106, 1115 (5th
Cir 1991).
76 See Michael D. Green, D. Michal Freedman, and Leon Gordis, Reference Guide
on Epidemiology, in Federal Judicial Center, Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence
333, 335-36 (Lexis 2d ed 2000). For example, sufficient long-term smoking of cigarettes
has been determined to generate a relative risk of ten of contracting lung cancer; many
courts accept anything greater than two as sufficient to support general causation. See id
at 384 & n 140. In conjunction with specific-causation support (the specific plaintiff con-
sistently engaged in such an activity), such cases are likely to settle rather than go to
trial. See Andrew F. Daughety and Jennifer F. Reinganum, Population-Based Liability
Determination, Mass Torts, and the Incentive for Suit, Settlement, and Trial, 26 J L,
Econ & Org 460, 466 (2009).
77 See Daughety and Reinganum, 26 J L, Econ & Org at 463 (cited in note 76).
78 See id at 473-74.
79 See id at 463-65.
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CONCLUSION
In this Article we have reviewed a number of models apply-
ing information economics to settlement bargaining, with con-
sideration of various legal rules, asking who learns what in
terms of revelation of private information about valuations. Con-
trary to what one might expect, precise revelation of private in-
formation about valuations due to such negotiation is surpris-
ingly limited. When bargaining fails and the threat (trial) is
employed, information about the private values of the bargain-
ers (for example, the level of damages suffered by a victim) is
likely to become known beyond the immediate parties-that is,
observable or inferable (at least in theory) by related or distant
parties80 However, settlement agreements may mask infor-
mation or, at the least, make inference by outsiders difficult.
Encouraging settlement is a prime directive of much of the legal
system;8' when successful, it decentralizes activity, reduces con-
gestion, and potentially protects privacy interests. As discussed
in Part II, a number of procedures and opportunities for invest-
ments in cases enhance the likelihood of settlement. Moreover,
rules of evidence and of civil procedure may limit information to
the bargaining parties (as discussed in Part II.B) or may reduce
or suppress the transmission of information to related parties
(as discussed in Parts III.B and III.C). Furthermore, recent de-
velopments in the funding of cases (see Part II.C) may (if opti-
mally implemented) reduce trials and the information they pro-
vide, as well as (essentially) eliminate the transmission of
information, even between the plaintiff and the defendant.
80 The traditional estimate is that only about 5 percent of cases proceed to trial. See
Theodore Eisenberg and Charlotte Lanvers, What Is the Settlement Rate and Why
Should We Care?, 6 J Empirical Legal Stud 111, 112 & n 1 (2009). Professor Theodore
Eisenberg and Charlotte Lanvers have recently shown, in a statistical analysis of data
from cases in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, that this does not imply a 95 percent
settlement rate. They find an average settlement rate closer to 67 percent; procedural
actions such as pretrial dismissal and default judgments also contribute to the difference
between trial and settlement rates. Id at 132.
8' See Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the
Meaning of Article III, 113 Harv L Rev 924, 926 & n 2 (2000).
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